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The final years of the 20th century mark the
fifty-year history of the “invention” of elec-
tronic computing. Although the United States
is now the greatest and most influential user of
computer technology, and has and continues
to produce great innovators, many advances
had their source in Europe. Today Europeans
continue to play an important role in the evo-
lution of computing.
One of the most interesting innovations to
come first from Europe was the application of
computers to automating business and admin-
istrative procedures and solving business prob-
lems. Today, business data processing (or
management information services as it’s often
called in the US) in all its forms, ranging from
transaction processing and decision support to
desktop publishing and e-mail, has become the
largest single use for computing technology.
The use of computers is pervasive in all kinds
of businesses and administrations.
One of the first uses of computers in the
business area came from a British food manu-
facturing and catering company, J. Lyons and
Company, and dates back to 1949.1 The case is
of particular interest because this innovative
use of computers was driven by an organization
that had no prior experience in electronics, yet
they built and applied to their business one of
the earliest stored-program computers, the LEO
I. Truly a case of user-driven innovation.
This article sets out, by means of a case
study and an analysis of the case, to describe
how J. Lyons came to design and build the
world’s first business computer.1-5 The analysis
is carried out in two stages. In the first, features
of the case are selected that might provide a
pragmatic explanation of how a food business
company achieved precedence in a field where
it might be expected that high-technology
equipment manufacturers would be expected
to lead. In the second stage, some theoretical
frameworks derived from recent research into
company culture and corporate success are
examined to see if they throw further light on
the case.
The case study
This study takes the case of J. Lyons to the
point where the company decided to design
and build their own computer in 1949. (Much
of the material in this case study, including
most of the quotations, are taken from Bird,3
and Caminer et al.4)
Company background
J. Lyons was founded in the late 19th cen-
tury by the successful tobacconists Salmon and
Gluckstein. The company name is derived from
a relative of the founders because, at the time,
Salmon and Gluckstein were not confident that
they would make a success of the new enter-
prise and did not want their own names asso-
ciated with a risky venture.
Salmon and Gluckstein formed the compa-
ny in 1887 to fill a gap in the catering market.
They had noted that catering facilities at exhi-
bitions and trade shows were often of a very
poor standard. They thought there would be a
market for affordable, quality food combined
with some entertainment at the many shows
and exhibitions held in locations throughout
the country. The provision of catering facilities
for short duration exhibitions required metic-
ulous planning both in the sense of controlling
the operation with its highly-peaked activities
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Nearly half a century ago the world’s first business computer
application was rolled out. The host for the application was a British
catering and food-manufacturing company, which had developed
and built its own computer, designed for business data processing.
The author traces the endeavor’s history and presents an analysis of
how and why the company—J. Lyons—was in a natural position to
take on the challenge, the precursor of the information revolution we
see today.
so as to provide the quality demanded by the
public and at the same time to maintain tight
control of costs. 
Thus J. Lyons management from their earli-
est days developed a culture of seeking the
most effective ways of controlling their busi-
ness. The company expanded rapidly from suc-
cess at catering for special events, very much a
niche market, to becoming one of the most
important and respected food companies in the
UK. In the 1940s and 1950s J. Lyons was one of
the most successful businesses in the UK with
its products, services, and establishments—
Lyons Tea, Lyons Cakes, Lyons Ice Cream, the
catering services provided at great national
events such as the Buckingham Palace Royal
Garden parties and the Wimbledon tennis
championships, and the Teashops and Corner
Houses (large, popular, but stylish London
restaurants)—being household names. 
From its beginnings the company embraced
a culture of self-sufficiency. It built or acquired
through purchase the capability to provide the
goods and services needed for the core business
of catering. It became a vertically integrated
company, with its own engineering works
designing and building machinery needed by
the factories, body shops that built the compa-
ny’s transport fleet, laboratories engaged in
food research, and laundries washing the com-
pany’s dirty linen. Of course, where the com-
pany identified suppliers capable of meeting
Lyons’ exacting standards they were used, but
the company ensured that such suppliers main-
tained laid down standards.
Nevertheless, the culture of self-sufficiency
led to a belief by management that there was
little the company could not do as well or bet-
ter than any outsider. Wartime experience
enhanced that confidence. Some of the Lyons
factories had been converted to the making of
munitions and company management prided
itself on their efficient conversion that put the
company on a wartime footing. 
Lyons had built its success on quality prod-
ucts and services sold to a mass market. Selling
to a competitive mass market required tight
control over costs and margins and a sensitive
response to customer preferences and market
movements. Given the very large number of
daily transactions—counted in tens of 
thousands—with an average very low value and
a profit margin per transaction of a fraction of
a penny, the company could progress only by a
constant striving for value adding innovation.
Senior management—primarily members of
the founding families, the Salmons and
Glucksteins, plus a few trusted senior employ-
ees such as George Booth, the company secre-
tary—recognized that progress could only be
maintained if the company hired people of
high academic standing. In 1923 they hired
John Simmons direct from Cambridge univer-
sity (where he had been a Wrangler, the term
Cambridge used for the highest performers in
the mathematics degree, and where he had
earned a first class honors degree in mathe-
matics) to join the company as a management
trainee and statistician. 
In an interview1 with Chris Evans at the
Science Museum about 1970 Simmons
explained: 
In fact I was engaged to try to build up a system
of information for the management of the com-
pany which would be superior, more sensible,
than just depending upon the profit and loss
account and such like. … in this respect the com-
pany was already ahead.
Simmons rose rapidly in the management
hierarchy and was responsible for introducing a
number of far reaching changes in practice and
in organization. These changes were designed
to cope with the growth of the business and to
achieve the control necessary for the mainte-
nance of profits. Simmons ensured that the
company kept up a continuous striving for
improving practice and, in doing this, intro-
duced many innovations in particular to the
management support services. This enabled
management to keep their business under con-
stant cost effective review. 
In the early 1930s Simmons set up the
Systems Research Office whose function was to
review existing systems; trawl the world for bet-
ter way of supporting management activities;
and invent, test, and implement improve-
ments. The Systems Research Office, working
with line managers, produced a stream of busi-
ness process innovations from the time of its
establishment. Examples include the notion
that sales representatives, each having a cus-
tomer group of many small retailers, would not
only be responsible for selling to their own cus-
tomer group but would also be totally respon-
sible for the accounting, credit, and payment
functions. These functions were conventional-
ly carried out at arms length by a separate
accounting office. The introduction of “travel-
er covered credit” was a radical business process
innovation, which increased efficiency and the
effectiveness of the representative—the sales
representative took responsibility for the
accounting necessary to maintain a customer
account.
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Before World War II the Systems Research
Office had for many years been investigating
the possibility of coping with the mass of trans-
action data by some kind of mechanization or
automation. They had started to investigate the
possibility of devising a document reader for
transaction data. They had researched the pos-
sible application of a unit record systems based
on punched cards but rejected these as too
localized, too constraining, and too costly.
Lyons had only one punched card installation
and that had a very limited application.
Instead, the company had installed alternative
types of office mechanization based on
accounting machines and calculators. 
By 1946 Simmons had been promoted to
the post of chief comptroller responsible for all
the management accounting and support func-
tions in the business, and in 1950 he joined the
family dominated Lyons’ board as an employee
director. In 1932 Lyons engaged another
Cambridge Wrangler, T.R. Thompson, who had
previously been employed as assistant secretary
to a large Liverpool store. Under Simmons’
tutelage Thompson also rose rapidly in the
organization and by 1946 had reached the posi-
tion of chief assistant comptroller.
John Kay6 in his study of what makes busi-
nesses successful suggests that architecture, by
which he means the structure and style of
responsibilities and relationships, is one of the
important enablers. Over the years Lyons had
developed a distinct management style based
on the way information was passed from oper-
ations—manufacturing, selling, distribution, as
well as the concomitant operations concerned
with invoicing and payments—to the decision
making senior management. Each of the many
businesses (tea, teashops, ice cream, bakeries,
kitchens, outside catering, and so on) had their
own groups of clerks and managers. The vast
mass of transaction data stemming from these
operations was summarized and compared
with preset standards, forecasts, and budgets.
The resulting information was analyzed by the
junior manager in charge of each group, who
would be responsible for explaining any impor-
tant variances. (In the Lyons grading structure,
junior managers were placed in the F or super-
visor grade and not deemed managers. Many of
them rose to manager rank in their subsequent
careers and some reached the very top of the
organization.) The junior manager had a direct
line to the senior manager, often a Lyons direc-
tor, responsible for that activity and to whom
the functioning of that activity had to be
explained. At the same time the senior manag-
er could ask the junior liaison manager to
undertake investigations of the “what if”
type—suppose we wish to increase the produc-
tion of Swiss rolls by 10 percent and reduce the
production of cupcakes by 3 percent, what
would be the effect on gross profit? The
arrangement ensured direct access by senior
management to information originating at the
operating level and bypassed the more usual fil-
tering through layers of middle management.
This management style provided the com-
pany, long before the advent of computers, with
both an almost real-time management infor-
mation system and a decision support system of
considerable sophistication. In addition, the
architecture and system provided senior man-
agement with a detailed picture of the week’s
trading on the Monday of the following week.
Yet in many other ways the company was
deeply traditional and conservative. It operat-
ed on a strictly hierarchical basis. At the top
were the owners, the founding families. They
ran the company with the help of very few
employee directors. Each grade of management
had its own dining room. Separate toilets divid-
ed managers from the rest. As might be expect-
ed in a company with these types of
relationships, interaction between employees
was conducted in a formal way with formal
modes of address, particularly to one’s superi-
ors in the hierarchy. Sports were encouraged
and a great variety of team games took place
with enthusiasm on the company’s large sports
grounds. Trade unions were discouraged,
though the family took a paternalistic interest
in its staff. 
Nevertheless, top management encouraged
innovation in working practices7 whether in
the factory with the design and introduction of
continuous ovens for the manufacture of miles
of Swiss rolls per day, or in the office with the
adoption of microfilm to provide a single
record of orders received that served as delivery
note and invoice. Management insisted, how-
ever, that all new practices had to be tested and
prototyped until most elements of risk had
been eliminated.
Initiation
In May 1947 two senior company execu-
tives, Thompson and Oliver Standingford—
another assistant comptroller who had joined
Lyons in 1930 as a management trainee—visit-
ed the US to see what developments in office
equipment had taken place since the start of
World War II. They found little significant
change in office equipment. But they did hear
about experiments with electronic brains, such
as the engineering numerical integrator and
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computer, or ENIAC, used exclusively for mili-
tary, scientific, and engineering calculations.
They recognized quickly that the characteris-
tics of the machines they saw could be modi-
fied to provide the necessary capabilities to
solve some of the problems of business data
processing. They visited a number of the pio-
neers and were particularly impressed by
Howard Aiken at Harvard whose practical
appreciation of bringing equipment into reli-
able operation mirrored their own ideas of the
problems that they might face 
Thompson and Standingford discovered
that few of the pioneers had thought about the
possibility of applying the machines to busi-
ness operations, though American Prudential
Insurance Company had already established
plans to use a computer for premium billing
and actuarial calculations. Both Aiken at
Harvard and Goldstine at Princeton told them
that England’s Cambridge university under
Professor Douglas Hartree—a mathematical
physicist—had started work on the electronic
delay storage automatic calculator (EDSAC). In
May 1949 EDSAC would become the world’s
first stored program computer to do regular
mathematical work.
On their return to England Thompson and
Standingford visited Cambridge where they
were introduced to Maurice Wilkes, director of
the mathematical laboratory, who had started
work on the EDSAC. They were most impressed
with the advances in the technology, well
beyond anything they had seen in the US.
However they wrote: 
Progress on the machine is slow and they talk of
12-18 months before completion. They have all
their plans drawn and the hold-up is purely due
to lack of money. Dr Wilkes and one draughts-
man assistant alone are handling the job, assist-
ed at the moment by two vacation students. We
told them that unless they could proceed more
rapidly they may find the machines for sale in
America before they complete their first model.
We were told that given £2000 they could com-
plete much more rapidly. Both Professor Hartree
and Dr Wilkes were willing and keen to co-oper-
ate with us, in particular they are interested in
applying their machine to any clerical job we
may suggest.8
Having gathered all the information they
thought they needed, Thompson and
Standingford produced a report for the Lyons
board, which they first showed to Simmons.
With Simmons full backing they presented the
report to the board, with a cover memorandum
that included inter alia the following statement:
We believe that we have been able to get a
glimpse of a development which will in a few
years time, have a profound effect on the way in
which clerical work (at least) is performed. Here,
for the first time, there is a possibility of a
machine which will be able to cope, at almost
incredible speed, with any variation of clerical
procedures, provided the conditions which gov-
ern the variations is predetermined. What effect
such machines could have on the semi-repetitive
work of the office needs only the slightest effort
of imagination. The possible savings from such
a machine should, be at least £50,000 a year. The
capital cost would be of the order of £100,000.
We feel, therefore, that the Company might
well wish to take a lead in the development of
the machine and indeed that, unless organisa-
tions such as ours, the potential users, are pre-
pared to do so, the time at which they become
commercially available will be unnecessarily
postponed for many years.
The report describes details of Thompson and
Standingford’s visits and the ideas discussed
with some of the computer pioneers. It describes
how the computer works, suggests how the
mathematical computers might need to be mod-
ified for business use, and goes on to indicate a
number of possible applications and how they
might be handled on the computer. These
included ideas for a variety of transaction pro-
cessing applications, but also hint at the possi-
bility of using the computer for word processing. 
Under the heading “Steps that might be
taken by Lyons to advance the development of
Electronic Machines” they wrote:
Our first concern is, of course, the advantage
which Lyons may gain from the commercial
development of electronic machines, but there
is a wider aspect which cannot be overlooked.
This machine may well be a prime factor in
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In May 1949 EDSAC would
become the world’s first
stored program computer 
to do regular 
mathematical work.
relieving the present economic distress of the
country. In this respect we cannot help but feel
that Lyons occupies a key position; no-one else
here, as far as we can learn, has realised the far-
reaching possibilities of electronic machines.
We assume that Lyons will want to take full
advantage of these machines for their own
offices. It is possible for us to play a passive role
by merely keeping in touch with developments,
and in due course buying machines as they
become available, probably from American
sources. But such a role would not enable us to
have any influence on the kind of machine built,
and without commercial influence they may be
built in a form more suited to handling mathe-
matical and census calculations owing to the
influence of the large governmental concerns.
Finally, the report laid out five possible
strategies for the Lyons board to consider that
would enable the company to apply computer
technology. These included the suggestion that
Lyons should support the efforts of Wilkes at
Cambridge with a financial grant and at the
same time provide him with examples of cleri-
cal procedures to use in programming experi-
ments. An alternative strategy suggested that:
We could build a machine in our own workshops
drawing on information and advice from
Harvard University.
The board was persuaded to accept the basic
recommendation that Lyons should itself take
the initiative to acquire a computer for its office
work. Once Booth, the company secretary, had
thrown his support behind the recommenda-
tion there was no dissension among board
members. They agreed to support the
Cambridge venture but to work towards build-
ing their own machine with the help of Wilkes
and his team. The board also agreed to help
finance the work at Cambridge with a grant of
£3000, the money to be made available as soon
as Cambridge could demonstrate that the
EDSAC could carry out serious mathematical
work. In addition, Lyons offered to make one
of their own people, Ernest Lenaerts, who had
been a clerk in the Lyons offices prewar but had
worked on radar during the war, available to
Cambridge. Lenaerts, whose formal education
has finished with high school examinations
(matriculations), became an important con-
tributor to the development of EDSAC and later
a key person in the design and building of
Lyons’ computer.
In return for the Lyons help package,
Cambridge agreed to help Lyons design and
build their own computer and to help recruit a
chief engineer, Dr. John Pinkerton, to head the
technical side of the project. A project team was
established and work commenced in 1949 to
design and build the computer. Simmons sug-
gested a name for the machine—Lyons
Electronic Office, or LEO. 
LEO differed from EDSAC in that it was
designed specifically for large-scale data pro-
cessing with multiple buffered input and out-
put channels, capable of being linked to a
variety of input and output devices. By 1951
the LEO team had built the basic computer and
the first experimental, but regular, business
application was being run for the Lyons bak-
eries. Further work in linking input and output
devices, extending the store, and improving
reliability continued until in December 1953,
LEO I was formally declared completed and
ready for full-scale operational work.
Discussion and analysis
To many observers the notion of a catering
company in England shortly after World War II
successfully pioneering what is now called the
information revolution seems unlikely and
incredible. Lyons not only recognized the
potential role of electronic computers for busi-
ness data processing but actually designed and
built such a machine. Indeed, the US edition of
the book User-Driven Innovation: The World’s
First Business Computer4 is called LEO—The
Incredible Story of the World’s First Business
Computer.1
The pragmatic explanation
Yet looking at J. Lyons in the period after
World War II, their recognition of computers as
a way ahead and the decision to build their
own should not be regarded as surprising.
There are a number of features in the way the
company had developed and was organized in
the immediate postwar period (1945-1955) that
provided the basis for the pioneering move
into business computing.
The nature of the business. The business
was characterized by the very large range of
food products and food providing services. This
was supported by a range of company owned
and managed services. The company sold its
products directly to the retail trade or through
its catering outlets directly to the public. This
resulted in a mass of transactions with relative-
ly low average values. Competitiveness depend-
ed on advantageous pricing of its products.
Thus the company was constantly fighting to
contain or reduce its costs of doing business—
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its transaction costs in the parlance of econo-
mists. Hence, its constant search for improving
its business processes in all aspects of the busi-
ness including manufacture; distribution; sup-
ply; and most relevant to the decision to
experiment with electronic computers, the sup-
port services provided by the office. The latter
were responsible for the standard processes
associated with bookkeeping and accounts,
payment of suppliers, charging customers, and
paying the staff but also with the management
support activities of providing management
information. By the middle 1930s the compa-
ny had established a systems research office to
put the search for improved methods onto a
more formal footing.
Personnel and leadership. Senior manage-
ment recognized that to sustain the growth and
competitiveness of the company it had to have
top-class management. Lyons was one of the
earliest companies to establish a management
trainee scheme and many of the people later
involved with the LEO enterprise first joined
Lyons as management trainees. These included
Standingford and Thompson. David Caminer,
probably the world’s first business program-
ming manager, joined Lyons as a management
trainee in 1936, became head of the systems
research office, and joined the LEO team as one
of its first members.
By recruiting people with top-class academic
qualifications, such as Simmons and Thompson,
and permitting them to take leadership roles in
the management of the company, the Lyons
management ensured that it was never short of
ideas on how to improve. This was reflected in
the esteem in which the company was held in
the first half of the 20th century. Their leading
role in developing systems was widely acknowl-
edged beyond the boundaries of their industry
sector. Simmons played a leading role in the
establishment of the Institute of Administrative
Management and was elected as its first presi-
dent. It is in keeping with this tradition that
Thompson and Standingford could claim in
their report that it was almost a duty for Lyons
to get directly involved in the design of a com-
puter for business applications to solve the crit-
ical problems of the nation (see preceding
quotation from the report).
Self-sufficiency. The economist Oliver
Williamson,9,10 suggests that firms have two
types of strategies for coping with transaction
costs. The first, which he calls hierarchies,
involves vertical integration. The firm attempts
to minimize transaction costs and retain con-
trol by becoming as self-sufficient as possible.
The second strategy, which he calls markets,
involves going to the market (or outsourcing in
today’s parlance) for all but the core activities
of the business. Companies minimize costs by
using the mechanisms of the marketplace and
retain control through contractual arrange-
ments with suppliers.
Lyons, in general, preferred the first strategy
because they had the confidence and experi-
ence to believe they could provide the relevant
goods or services more effectively than any
contractor. Of course, some goods and services
had to be subcontracted or purchased when
investigations showed that appropriate suppli-
ers were available. But even then, Lyons, like
Marks and Spencer (one of the UK’s leading
retailers), set up an organization that set stan-
dards and ensured that the suppliers them-
selves were efficient and were always seeking
improvements. Thus it did not take Lyons long
to realize that outside suppliers capable of
meeting the requirements envisioned by
Simmons and Thompson simply did not exist
in the late 1940s. The company had confidence
based on previous experience—including the
very recent experiences of the war—that they
were capable of effectively organizing busi-
nesses remote from their core food business.
The academic frameworks
Recent research throws some light on the
conditions that have to be fulfilled if an enter-
prise is to be successful and capable of sus-
tained innovation. Does the research and the
frameworks developed help explain how the
Lyons of the 1940s and 1950s came to be first
in the development of computers working on
business applications?
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By recruiting people with top
academic qualifications and
permitting them to take
leadership roles, the Lyons
management ensured that it
was never short of ideas on
how to improve. 
Goffee and Jones. The most recent study is
by Goffee and Jones11 and reports on research
that they are conducting on the relationship
between company success and different styles
of company culture. They distinguish between
two dimensions of culture. The first dimension
is concerned with the degree of sociability
achieved by the employees of the organization.
The second is concerned with the degree of sol-
idarity present among the employees. 
By sociability Goffee and Jones mean a cul-
ture that regards the organization as a commu-
nity and encourages sincere friendship among
its employees. Relationships are often more
important than measures of performance.
Hence it is rare to point the finger at a colleague
who is under performing. Employees tend to
share values and a high value is put on achiev-
ing consensus, even if that means engaging in
compromise. Esprit de corps tends to be high;
teamwork flourishes; and “a spirit of openness
to new ideas, and freedom to accept out-of-the-
box thinking” prevails. There is a wide range of
sociability in organizations, from enterprises
with few social contacts and few good rela-
tionships to enterprises that offer a well-bal-
anced community or family.
Solidarity, in contrast, implies shared objec-
tives rather than shared values. “Its relationships
are based on common tasks, mutual interests, or
shared goals that will benefit all involved par-
ties.” The organization will respond quickly to
outside threats, and low-level performers are not
tolerated. Members regard achieving consensus
as having a low value and think it works against
achieving high performance targets and could
even help competitors. A good example is where
in an effort to achieve consensus, difficult deci-
sions are delayed, permitting a sharper com-
petitor to take the lead. Employees are clear
about job definitions and organizational roles.
Again organizations vary enormously in the
degree of solidarity achieved.
Goffee and Jones note that successful organ-
izations can exist at all points in the two
dimensions, including the extremes. They go
on to suggest that we can classify organiza-
tional culture into four archetypes: networked,
communal, fragmented, and mercenary. Each
archetype is associated with a position on the
sociability and solidarity dimensions. Again,
each can be the basis of a successful enterprise,
though they suggest that it is possible to devise
a contingency framework that indicates the
best fit between the cultural archetype and the
enterprise. Goffee and Jones plot the two
dimensions of culture, sociability, and solidari-
ty against the four archetypes in a two by two
table, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Does the Lyons of the 1940s and 1950s fit
into this model? I used the assessment question-
naire provided by Goffee and Jones (see Figure 2)
and rated Lyons in terms of sociability as mod-
erately high. (Note: This questionnaire was not
administered to a sample of Lyons’ employees
from the 1940s and 1950s, but was completed by
the author and an ex-LEO colleague.) The rather
formal, hierarchical structure of the firm was off-
set by the paternalistic attitude of the founding
family, reflected by the social activities sponsored
by the company. There were a large number of
social events organized through a variety of cul-
tural and sporting clubs. A relatively large num-
ber of employees took part in social events and
often participated with their families. In these
clubs, rank within the company, except at the
most senior level, played little part. Ability at
football, or chess, or bridge, or organizing con-
certs counted for more and led to esteem among
the peer group. There was undoubtedly a Lyons
esprit de corps. Sometimes newcomers found it
difficult to enter established networks of friend-
ship. This is in keeping with Goffee and Jones’
findings that report the formation of cliques in
some of the organizations that rated high on the
scale of sociability.
In terms of the other dimension, solidarity,
using the questionnaire Lyons scored a some-
what higher rating then on the sociability scale.
The company introduced management by
objectives as a way of ensuring that all employ-
ees had a definition of what was expected of
them and, indeed, participated in the definition
of the roles and the way performance was meas-
ured. Company solidarity was reflected in the
arrogance with which members of the Lyons
staff regarded competitors. There was a general
feeling that Lyons the company and Lyons
employees were an elite.











Figure 1. Two dimensions, four cultures.
As Goffee and Jones
point out many managers
assume that the top right
hand quadrant of Figure 1,
scoring high on both the
sociability and solidarity
dimensions, the commu-
nal type of culture, is the
most likely to indicate a
successful company. But
their research suggested
that the communal type of
culture tends to be unsta-
ble and is rarely sustained.
Some of the characteristics
of high sociability, for
example, the reluctance to
“shop” the low-level per-
former, are inherently in
conflict with the high soli-
darity characteristics of
putting a high value on
business objectives.
Nevertheless, they did find
in existence organizations
characterized as commu-
nal and for which that
type of culture was appro-
priate and associated with
success. Goffee and Jones
suggest that strong, charis-
matic, leadership that
believes in the values asso-
ciated with sociability but,
at the same time, is
absolutely clear on the
direction the company is
driving and doesn’t permit
subpar performance is nec-
essary to sustain the com-
munal culture.
The Lyons of the 1940s and 1950s fits rea-
sonably well into the communal culture quad-
rant, scoring quite well on sociability and
somewhat higher on solidarity. Does this help to
answer the question of how they came to make
the decision to design and build a business com-
puter to serve their management?
Goffee and Jones found three features com-
mon to enterprises that could be described as
having communal cultures and were success-
ful over a long period.
They found that successful communal cul-
tures are associated with organizations in
which extensive teamwork across functions
makes innovation possible. They give as an
example a pharmaceutical company (Glaxo
Wellcome) in which competitive success is
based on a continuous stream of patent-pro-
tected product innovation. But, although
product innovation is important in the food
business, there is little protection against copy-
ing, and more competitive advantages may be
gained from process innovation both in man-
ufacturing processes and support service
processes. In Lyons, process innovation was
encouraged through suggestion schemes and
more formally via the activities of the systems
research office. A stream of new ideas bubbled
up through the organization and many were
implemented over the years. Perhaps the same
conditions that encourage product innovation
in the pharmaceutical industry stimulated the
kind of process innovation that led Lyons
towards the recognition that computers would
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Figure 2. Goffee and Jones’ organization assessment questionnaire.
What is your Organization’s Culture
To assess your organization’s level of sociability, answer the following ques-
tions:
Low Medium High
1. People here try to make friends and to 
keep their relationships strong   
2. People here get along well   
3. People in our group often socialise
outside the office   
4. People here really like one another   
5. When people leave our group, we stay in touch   
6. People here do favours for others
because they like one another   
7. People here often confide in one another
about personal matters   
To assess your organization’s level of solidarity, answer the following
questions:
1. Our group understands and shares 
the same business objectives   
2. Work gets done effectively and productively   
3. Our group takes strong action to address
poor performance   
4. Our collective will to win is high   
5. When opportunities for competitive advantage
arise, we move quickly to capitalize on them   
6. We share the same strategic goals   
7. We know who he competition is   
help to make them more efficient and effective.
In Lyons, the stream of ideas for improvement
could only be effectively implemented if the
necessary teamwork was deeply embedded in
the culture.
Again the confidence to take on new types
of work like designing a computer inside the
organization rather than going outside to spe-
cialist contractors stems from the same com-
munal characteristics.
Goffee and Jones’ second feature of a suc-
cessful communal culture is that there are real
synergies among organizational subunits and
real opportunities for learning. Again these
appear to be important characteristics when it
comes to disseminating and implementing the
range of innovations discussed previously.
Lyons encouraged the synergy and learning by
widely broadcasting throughout the organiza-
tion what the company was attempting in its
LEO venture. Although the rapid growth of the
LEO team necessitated recruiting, mainly of
new graduates from the outside, many of the
early LEO team members came from a variety
of job functions inside Lyons. This, too, facili-
tated mutual learning and synergy. 
The third finding of Goffee and Jones sug-
gests that a communal culture is important in
organizations that have to take a long view—
where strategies are long-term rather than
short-term. Clearly the Lyons decision to build
and apply a computer looks like a long-term
strategy, and thus supports the notion that a
communal culture would enable long-term
views to be taken. However, it is worth noting
that the Lyons management was somewhat
optimistic both on how long it would take to
get the computer built and online and the time
it would take to pay off the investment. Early
estimates suggested that a time period of about
two years for building the computer and a fur-
ther two years to recover the costs would be
needed. Perhaps a planning horizon of four
years might be regarded as taking a long view
in the food industry. There is no doubt that the
Lyons management looked at the possibility of
computers as one that influenced not only the
long-term strategy of the company itself, but as
something that might affect the whole direc-
tion of business practice in the UK.
Goffee and Jones note that organizations
operating in a dynamic and complex business
environment benefited from having a commu-
nal culture. In the immediate postwar period
almost all businesses were faced with the tran-
sition from working on a wartime footing to
that of peacetime. In the food industry the con-
tinuing problems of food rationing increased
this complexity. Perhaps Lyons survived the
complexities of the postwar period by having a
communal culture. More importantly it is a
culture that enabled the company to behave in
a dynamic manner.
What Goffee and Jones’ research point to is
that culture provides the environment in
which success or failure is played out. Certain
types of culture facilitate or enable organiza-
tional behavior. The communal culture Lyons
appeared to have in the 1940s and 1950s would
lead us to expect a company that encouraged
and welcomed innovation and was confident
and capable of taking the long view and make
long-term strategic judgments. It appears that
it was a company capable of learning and
therefore absorbing change and innovation.
Goffee and Jones’ research helps us place Lyons
in its cultural context and to understand how
the particular strengths of that culture could
lead to the decisions they made.
John Kay. The second framework is derived
from John Kay.6 His research into what factors
underlie corporate success found that four dis-
tinctive capabilities are associated with the suc-
cessful enterprise. Kay notes that particular
architectures, good reputation, a flow of inno-
vation, and the presence of strategic assets are
characteristics associated with successful enter-
prises. Any one of these can help to distinguish
an enterprise and lead to its success. Although,
usually more than one of the capabilities are
present, and the presence of one can lead to
others. Thus an appropriate architecture can
help the business become a successful innova-
tor, which in turn can ensure a sustained and a
high reputation.
By architecture Kay means the set of formal
and informal relations that exist in the enter-
prise. Kay describes architecture as “...a network
of relational contracts within, or around, the
firm.” As noted previously, Lyons had devel-
oped a management style—really an architec-
ture in Kay’s sense—that provided clear
information channels between operational and
management levels unblocked by problems of
hierarchy and its associated bureaucracy. This
had three effects. It brought operational man-
agement and their supervisors into close con-
tact with senior level management, resulting in
mutual trust and esteem and hence, effective
teamwork despite the existence of a notional
hierarchy. Next, it made quick decision making
possible at the senior level. Finally, it enabled
new ideas bubbling up from the lower levels to
be brought to the attention of senior manage-
ment and acted upon speedily.
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Reviewing the case study it is clear that
Lyons in the period under discussion had been
a company in which a flow of innovations
(both process innovations concerned primari-
ly with administrative procedures in the offices,
and technical processes in the manufacturing
units) and product innovations were facilitat-
ed by the distinct architecture developed by the
company. Later all three consequences of the
architecture helped to start the LEO project.
The mutual trust engendered by the manage-
ment style and architecture enabled the Lyons
board to respond positively and quickly to the
report produced by Thompson and Standing-
ford without the delays (and obfuscation) gen-
erated by some other architectures. 
The second distinctive capability identified by
Kay is reputation. Kay illustrates the role of rep-
utation in sustaining company success. A good
illustration from today (not from Kay) of the role
played by reputation is the Virgin organization
and its charismatic founder Richard Branson.
Branson made his reputation early by founding a
successful record business. This reputation has
carried over to the extent that the market
appears willing to provide support for Branson
whenever he branches into businesses that
appear to be dominated by established corpora-
tions, such as Coca Cola, British Airways, or the
major financial services companies. 
The fact that Lyons had established a reputa-
tion of “can do” in catering and food manufac-
turing and in World War II in making munitions
made it more believable that it could also make
a success of computers. Management had the
confidence that they could make computers
suitable for business needs, where they also
believed that more conventional electronic and
business machine companies would be much
slower off the mark. Lyons’ management had a
belief in their company reputation. But to suc-
ceed they needed others to share that belief.
Would Cambridge university have been willing
to collaborate with Lyons in building LEO as a
successor to EDSAC if they did not share the
confidence in the Lyons reputation? Subse-
quently, despite some skepticism, Lyons’ repu-
tation and in particular the reputation of certain
individuals, such as John Simmons, played a
major role in the successful launch of LEO Com-
puters as a vendor of business computers.
The third distinctive capability in the Kay
framework is innovation. He notes that it is
often not enough for an enterprise to have the
ability to make innovations. Too often the
innovator does not reap the benefit of the inno-
vation or cannot sustain the advantages which
the innovations were expected to convey. He
argues that it requires other distinct capabilities,
notably architecture, to enable innovation to
translate into business success. Kay’s notion of
architecture comes close to the concept of cul-
ture as defined by Goffee and Jones. 
Lyons appears to have had the architecture
characterized by their communal culture to
welcome and accept process innovations of a
quite radical nature. Whether they had the
capability to reap the benefits of all the inno-
vations and, in particular, their pioneering
efforts in adapting information technology to
the business, requires analysis of the later stages
of the initiation, dissemination, and imple-
mentation of the technology.
The final distinct capability identified by Kay
is the availability of strategic assets. Strategic
assets to Kay comprise features such as the pos-
sibility of controlling the market via a monop-
oly position. Perhaps the LEO venture was made
possible by the existence of a supply-side vacu-
um. Lyons’ strategic asset was the lack of a viable
supplier in the UK just at the time that
Thompson and Standingford produced their
report. Another strategic asset was the availabil-
ity within the Lyons organization of employees
of the caliber of Simmons, Thompson,
Standingford, and Caminer. Without this very
distinctive asset it is doubtful whether Lyons
would have initiated the LEO project and built
the world’s first business computer.
A feature of Lyons at that time was that they
had developed strength in all four of Kay’s dis-
tinct capabilities, and that they reinforced each
other. The right architecture led to innovation.
Successful innovations improved reputation.
Lyons had become an acknowledged leader in
innovation for administrative efficiency. The
strategic asset of the lack of supply-side com-
petition was perhaps fortuitous, but having the
right people on board was a consequence both
of reputation —the best people wanted to work
for Lyons—and of the architecture.
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Lyons appears to have had
the architecture to welcome
and accept process
innovations of a quite 
radical nature. 
Conclusion
All three strands in the analysis—that based
on a pragmatic analysis of the case history and
those based on the academic frameworks—con-
tribute to our retrospective understanding of
how Lyons came to initiate such an unlikely
venture as to invent the business computer.
Retrospective analysis is always easier than pre-
diction. Do the three bases of analysis used in
the article, individually or in combination,
enable us to predict which enterprises will lead
(successfully) in innovation and which are
more likely to be followers? These bases may
help us identify enterprises that have in place
the conditions for making successful and sus-
tained innovation possible. They may also help
identify the businesses that are unlikely to take
up a leadership role via innovation. However,
no single framework provides certain answers.
Used in combination they may provide greater
powers of analysis. 
Innovation theory itself has produced a
number of theoretical models and frameworks.
Many of these emphasize the diffusion and
adaption phases of the innovation phenome-
non and are less relevant to the earlier inven-
tion and initiation phases. In the later stages of
this study, analyzing the adoption by Lyons of
the LEO computer and the diffusion of the
technology first through Lyons and then many
other companies, more use is made of theories
of technology transfer12-15 including those
which are specifically tailored to the special
case of information technology and informa-
tion systems.16-18
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